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We investigate the stability of measured risk attitudes over time, using a 13-year longitudinal 
sample of individuals in the NLSY79. We find that an individual’s risk aversion changes 
systematically in response to personal economic circumstances.  Risk aversion increases 
with lengthening spells of employment and time out of labor force, and decreases with 
lengthening unemployment spells.  However, the most important result is that the majority 
of the variation in risk aversion is due to changes in measured individual tastes over time and 
not to variation across individuals.  These findings that measured risk preferences are 
endogenous and subject to substantial measurement errors suggest caution in interpreting 
coefficients in models relying on contemporaneous, one-time measures of risk preferences. 
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Although the theory of economic decision under uncertainty typically presumes that 
individuals have time-invariant risk preferences, a series of empirical papers have raised 
doubts about the validity of the presumed stable risk preferences.  More than two decades 
ago, Love and Robison (1984) examined the intertemporal stability of risk preferences using 
a data set including just 23 American farmers.  Individual’s risk preferences were elicited 
through choices between pairs of possible incomes at four different income levels in 1979 
and again in 1981.  They found that risk preferences were not stable over time, although 
they could not establish a firm pattern of change in risk preferences over two years.  More 
recently, Andersen et al. (2008), using 97 Danish adults from experiments, found that an 
individual’s risk attitudes change over a 17-month time period, but they also could not 
establish a definable pattern of either positive or negative change in risk preferences across 
time.  While optimistic perceptions of personal financial security tend to reduce risk 
aversion, no other demographic characteristic was correlated with variation in risk attitudes 
across time.  In both studies, relatively short time spans and few observations per individual 
made it difficult to draw any conclusions beyond the apparent instability of risk preferences.  
That leaves open the possibility that instability is due more to random measurement errors in 
risk measurement than to a behavioral response to changing economic circumstances.  
Past studies have tried to establish how various economic or demographic attributes 
‘cause’ attitudes toward risk using cross-sectional data.  The evidence is uneven.  Donkers 
et al. (2001) find that more educated and higher income individuals are less risk averse.  
Hartog et al. (2002) also find that wealthier individuals are less risk averse.  However, 
Barsky et al. (1997) show that risk aversion increases with income and wealth for the lower 
half of their distributions.  Donkers et al. (2001), Barsky et al. (1997), and Riley and Chow 
(1992) all find that risk aversion varies by age, but they disagree on the direction of the 
correlation.  The most consistent finding is that women are more risk averse than men 
(Donkers et al. 2001; Hartog et al. 2002).  Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) find that the 
2 
 
unemployed are less risk averse than job holders.  
A more recent strand of the literature has begun to question whether measures of risk 
aversion depend on the risk elicitation method.  Barseghyan et al. (2011) found that 
households tend to be more risk averse when facing hypothetical deductible decisions 
involving home insurance compared to auto insurance.  Anderson and Mellor (2009) find 
that risk preferences obtained from experiments using real money prizes are not consistent 
with those inferred from surveys with hypothetical gambles.  Binswanger (1980) observed 
that the distribution of measured risk aversion shifts to the right as proposed payoffs increase 
in a field experiment in India.  Holt and Laury (2002) derive the same conclusion in a 
sample of American students.  
Another strand of literature suggests that individual risk attitudes depend on feelings 
or emotions at the time risk is assessed.  Raghunathan and Pham (1999) find that anxiety 
makes people more risk averse whereas sadness makes people less risk averse.  Lerner and 
Keltner (2000) show that fearful people are more pessimistic and so they are less likely to 
take on risk.  In a similar vein, but focusing on personal experience on stock market returns, 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that people who experienced higher stock market returns 
show greater willingness to take risk.  
While there appears to be consensus that measured risk preferences vary with 
elicitation mechanisms at a point in time, there is less evidence that measures of risk 
preferences using the same elicitation method are subject to change over time.  Finding 
cross-sectional variation in risk preferences across individuals at one point in time does not 
prove that individual risk preferences are unstable.  This chapter explores the long-term 
stability of measured risk preferences by exploiting a 13-year longitudinal sample of 
individuals in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79) over which risk 
attitudes were elicited on four different waves.  The longer time series allows us to evaluate 
not just whether preferences are stable, but whether variation in preferences is dominated by 
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variation in risk preferences across individuals or by variation in individual risk preferences 
over time.  Furthermore, the large sample size and long time frame allow us to identify some 
clear regularities in how risk attitudes change due to individual economic circumstances.    
We find dramatic evidence that measured risk preferences for individuals are not 
stable: 57% of the total variance in measured risk aversion is attributable to changing 
individual risk attitudes over time and only 43% to variation across individuals.  Even after 
controlling for plausible demographic and economic factors that might alter individual 
attitudes toward risk, the within variance due to unexplained changes in individual risk 
aversion over time dominates the between variance across individuals. To the extent that the 
within variation is an indication of measurement error, over half of the variation in measured 
risk preferences is noise, suggesting that there will be significant bias when such measures 
are included in regressions explaining economic behavior.  
Although many cross-sectional studies found that demographic variables such as age, 
education, and marriage are correlated with variation in risk aversion, we find that changing 
personal economic circumstances have a greater impact on individual risk aversion than do 
changing demographics.  Individuals become more risk averse as their incomes rise and as 
the duration of a current employment spell increases.  Risk aversion also increases with 
duration of time spent out of the labor force and with accumulated work experience.  In 
contrast, risk aversion decreases with length of a current unemployment spell.  Because risk 
preferences respond to current economic circumstances, they cannot be viewed as causal 
factors in studies of contemporaneous economic decisions such as occupational choice, 
earnings, or entrepreneurship. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I reviews data and measures 
of risk aversion.  Section II discusses empirical methodologies for testing the intertemporal 
stability of risk aversion.  Empirical results that reject the stability of risk aversion are 
presented in section III.  Section IV concludes.   
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I. Data and Measures of Risk Aversion 
 
The data is drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 (NLSY79).  
The NLSY79 offers a consistently designed lifetime income gamble questions to respondents 
in 1993, 2002, 2004, and 2006.  
In the hypothetical gamble questions, the individual is asked to choose between a 
safe job paying a fixed current income and a risky job that will return a higher expected 
return but with a chance of income below the safe level.  The risk questions are as follows: 
 
(Q1) Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job guaranteed 
to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are given the opportunity to take a 
new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance that it will double your (family) income and a 50-50 
chance that it will cut your (family) income by a third. Would you take the new job? 
 
The individuals who answered ‘yes’ to this question were then asked: (Q2) suppose the chances were 
50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it would cut it in half. Would you still 
take the new job? Those who answered ‘no’ to the first question (Q1) then asked: (Q3) suppose the 
changes were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it would cut it by 20 
percent. Would you take the new job? 
 
Responses to the series of gamble questions are used to elicit measures of risk 
aversion.  Degree of risk aversion is measured by the degree to which the respondent is 
willing to accept downside risk, measured by the amount that could be reduced.  We 
construct an ordered categorical risk aversion index ranging from 1 to 4 and so the risk index 
goes from the least to the most risk averse.  
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Our sample includes all respondents who answered the risk questions in at least two 
years between 1993 and 2006.  We drop households that report zero family income which 
excludes less than 1% of the sample.  We also drop those who have incomplete information 
on demographics.  Our conclusions are not sensitive to these sample inclusion criteria.  The 
final sample is large: 5,197 respondents answered the risk questions in 1993; 5,424 in 2002; 
5,387 in 2004; 5,698 in 2006, and 3,805 in all four years.  The final analysis sample contains 
21,706 person-year observations.  Therefore, our study uses a much larger sample than the 
past longitudinal studies which had at most 300 observations.   
Distributions of measured risk aversion in the unbalanced panel sample over time are 
reported in Panel A of Table 1.  Most respondents fall into the most risk averse category and 
the second largest portion into the least risk averse category.  This suggests that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in risk attitudes across individuals.  There is a tendency for 
increasing risk aversion with age: 46% were in the most risk averse category in 1993 but 57% 
in 2006.  The largest decline is in the least risk averse group which falls from 25% to 17%.  
However, the progression to greater average risk aversion with age masks considerable 
variation in the patterns of changing risk aversion across individuals as shown in Panel B of 
Table 1.  Panel B focuses on the balanced panel of 3,805 individuals who answered the risk 
aversion question all four years.  We show the distribution of 2006 risk aversion measures 
by 1993 measured risk aversion.  Only 43% remained in the same risk aversion category 
over 13 years.  Only 2% stayed in the same risk aversion category all four years.   
As in Panel B, there is a movement toward greater average risk aversion as age 
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increases:  46% of those in the least risk averse category in 1993 were in the most risk 
averse category in 2006.  However, 33% of those in the most risk averse category in 1993 
became less risk averse in 2006.  The changes in measured aversion are not of modest size 
as 35% moved at least 2 risk categories between the two periods.  These intertemporal 
changes cannot be explained as just reflecting an aging cohort of respondents. 
 
II. Testing for the stability of risk aversion over time 
 
 In order to test the presumption that risk aversion is stable over time, we first 
incorporate analysis of variance (ANOVA).  We measure the relative stability of risk 
aversion by assessing how much of the variance in measured risk aversion is attributable to 
variation across individuals and how much is due to due to variation in individual risk 
aversion over time.  ANOVA allows us to decompose the total variance in response to the 
income gamble question into ‘between’ individual and ‘within’ individual components.  The 
between variance is due to deviations of individual mean risk aversion from the sample mean.  
The within variance is due to changes in measured risk aversion within an individual over 
time.  
With n individuals in the sample and 4 temporally separated measures of risk 
aversion for each individual i, the total sum of square (TSS) partitioned into sum of squared 
errors (SSE) and sum of squares of treatments (SST) can be written as: 
TSS = SSE + SST 
(1)    
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individual’s average measured risk aversion over 4 years; 0
1
1 n
i
in
 

   denotes the sample 
mean of measured risk aversion across individuals in the sample; and 2  is variance of 
measured risk aversion.1   
The SSE corresponding to the first term of equation (1) measures the within variance 
due to changes in individuals measured risk aversion, while the second term measures the 
between variance due to differences in mean risk preferences across individuals.  The TSS 
can be alternatively estimated by the sum of the two variance components or by equation (2).  
We report the variance decomposition in Panel A of table 2.  Surprisingly, 57% of 
the total variance comes from the within individual component and only 43% is due to the 
between variance.  The majority of the variance in risk aversion is due to changing 
individual risk preferences over time and not to different risk preferences across individuals.  
Nor is this result due to some regular pattern of evolving risk preferences as individuals age.   
Panel B reports the within and between variation in risk aversion after controlling for 
a vector itX  of demographic attributes that could explain why individual risk attitudes 
might change over time: age, marriage, education, and number of kids.  If risk preferences 
change as these demographic attributes change over the sample period, they will reduce the 
within component.  However, after removing the variance attributable to these non-
economic variables, the within variance falls only to 54% from 57%, and so the within 
component is still larger than the variation across individuals.   
Since the sizeable within component is not due to non-economic factors, it is 
potentially influenced by changing economic circumstances.  We take on that question next. 
 
A. What personal economic circumstances affect risk aversion over time? 
To explore the transitory economic factors that alter measured risk attitudes, we first 
                                             
1 See Appendix 1 for full derivation of equation (1). 
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must control for any underlying differences in tastes for risk across individuals.  That 
suggests using a fixed-effects regression that will control for unobservable individual tastes 
and all other time-invariant factors ui.  We also add the time-varying elements of the vector 
of demographic factors, Xit, including age and its square, education, marital status, and 
number of children.  We then add a vector of time-varying labor market factors, Mit to a 
regression explaining changes in measured risk preferences over time.  The linear regression 
model with fixed effects is 
(3)         ߠ௜௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ߚ௑ ൅ ܯ௜௧ߚெ ൅ ݑ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧, ߝ௜௧~ܰሺ0, ߪଶሻ  
As before, it is an ordered categorical risk aversion index variable ranging from the 
least risk averse to the most risk averse for an individual i at time t.  The vector Mit contains 
time-varying measures that reflect individual household and local labor market economic 
status: the net family income and its square, years of previous labor market experience, the 
duration of recent employment, unemployment, and out of labor force spells, and the local 
unemployment rate.  Gender, race, and other factors that do not change over the sample 
period are absorbed by the individual fixed effects. 
It is possible that measures of degree of risk aversion are nonlinear.  Thus, 
alternatively we estimate an ordered probit model.  More specifically, random effect ordered 
probit model and an ordered probit model clustering the standard errors on the level of the 
individual are incorporated to show our results are robust to the alternative specifications.  
 
B. Measures of key independent variables 
 Weekly labor force information and interview date are available in the NLSY79.  
Accordingly, we were able to identify each individual’s labor force status—employed, 
unemployed, or out of labor force—at the time individual risk aversion was measured.  
Unemployed individuals and those out of labor force differ in that the unemployed are 
actively looking for a job while those out of labor force are neither working nor looking for 
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work.  Hence, the unemployed are constrained from their presumed preferred time 
allocation (employment) while those out of the labor force are in control of their time 
allocation.  The employed are also nominally meeting their time allocation objectives.  Our 
measure is the length of the current time allocation spell since the last interview and so the 
maximum length of the current spell is 2 years.  
Previous labor market experience is measured by cumulative years spent at work 
since the first survey year, 1979.  Net family income variable is created by NLSY79 at each 
wave.  The descriptive statistics of variables are summarized in Appendix 2.  
 
III. Results 
  
 Table 3 reports estimation results using various model specifications.  The first 
four columns are fixed effects estimates of the linear model.  In the first column, age and 
age-squared are the only regressors.  Age has a significant effect on changes in measured 
risk aversion over time.  Risk aversion increases until age 52 and then decreases.2  The R-
squared statistic is the ratio of the between variance to the total variance and so the within and 
between variances can be inferred by the R-squared statistic.  As 57% of the total variance 
was due to the within-individual component without controlling for any cofactors, removing 
only the variation in age lowers the within component to 54%.  When we add the other time-
varying non-economic variables—education, marriage, and number of kids—the proportion 
of total variance attributable to the within component remains 54%.   
 When we include only time-varying economic variables in the third column, the 
within component is also 54%.  We then let the non-economic and economic variables 
compete with one another in column 4.  The within variance remains at 54%.  However, we 
                                             
2 In the study of Barsky et. al (1997) using older cohorts (age between 50 and 70) from Health and Retired 
Study (HRS), risk aversion starts to decrease at age 60 without controlling for any factors. 
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can no longer reject the null hypothesis that the effect of the demographic factors on risk 
preferences is jointly zero (F5,n-5=1.72, p>0.1).3  On the other hand, the effect of the 
economic factors are jointly significant (F7,n-7=5.49, p=0.00).  Hence, economic 
circumstances rather than demographic variation are the more important observable source of 
changing risk attitudes over time.  Nevertheless, the dominant source of variation in risk 
preferences remains the within component, even after controlling for economic and 
demographic variables.    
When economic variables are added, the relationship between age and risk aversion 
weakens.  Peak risk aversion now occurs at age 43 and decreasing thereafter.  The 
weakening effect of age on risk preferences is due to the correlation between age and risking 
income and job security, both of which raise risk aversion.  This nonlinear effect of age on 
risk aversion conflicts with findings from single cross-sectional studies that risk aversion 
rises monotonically with age (Riley and Chow 1992; Donkers et al. 2001; Dohmen et al. 
2006) but is similar to results reported by Barsky et al. (1997).  Unlike earlier conclusions 
based on studies using a single cross-section, changes in education do not affect measured 
risk aversion.  And changes in marital status have only small effects that are statistically 
significant only at the 10% level.    
 Changing economic circumstances do influence risk preferences by statistically 
significant but numerically small amounts.  Risk aversion increases with net family income 
at a decreasing rate with peak risk aversion at $307 thousand.  In other words, household 
become increasingly risk averse as income rises for virtually the entire range of household 
income.  Because age and income are positively correlated, conclusions regarding the 
pattern of risk preferences by age in previous studies may have been clouded by the 
underlying correlation between age and household economic status.  Our results that risk 
                                             
3 Marital status, fertility behavior and education may be a consequence of risk preferences rather than a causal 
factor.  However, none of our results are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of these factors, and so we 
include them for completeness. 
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preferences rise with income are consistent with Barsky et al. (1997) and Bellemare and 
Brown (2010).   
Previous studies argued that more risk-averse job seekers exit unemployment faster 
(Stephenson 1976; Feinberg 1977) or that the employed are more risk averse than the 
unemployed (Halek and Eisenhauer 2001).  However, the direction of causality is uncertain 
when based solely on cross-sectional data.  The longitudinal data used in this study allows 
us to investigate whether the duration of employment, unemployment, or out of labor force 
spells affect risk preferences.  We find that among those who are currently employed, risk 
aversion increases with the duration of employment spell.  Risk aversion also increases with 
the duration of time spent out of the labor force.  To the extent that employment or out of 
labor force are the desired state, these results suggest that risk aversion increases with 
persistence in success at time allocation decisions.  In contrast, risk aversion decreases with 
length of current unemployment spell or persistent lack of success in time allocation.  A one 
standard deviation increase in weeks of a current employment spell raises risk aversion by 
1.6%, evaluated at sample means.  A one standard deviation increase in time out of the labor 
force increases risk aversion by 1.4%.  On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase 
in unemployment spell lowers risk aversion by 0.5%.   
These effects are quite small.  It takes a consistent spell of 1-2 years to move 
measured risk preferences up or down by one point.  Nevertheless, individuals are more 
responsive to current spells than accumulated labor market experience.  A 52 week current 
employment spell raises risk aversion 3 times more than one year of accumulated work 
experience.   
 The last two columns remove the fixed effects and allow nonlinearities in the 
measured risk aversion using an ordered probit specification.  These estimates allow us to 
show that some of the demographic effects are captured by the individual fixed effects as 
marital status and education do not change for large fractions of the sample.  In addition, 
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males are significantly less risk averse than women.  However, the signs and significance of 
the economic variables remain intact.   
 Regardless of specification, we easily reject the hypothesis that risk preferences do 
not respond to current and accumulated household economic circumstances.4  The 
implication is that risk preferences are endogenous to economic success.  One cannot use 
contemporaneously measured risk preferences to ‘explain’ labor market decisions regarding 
search, employment, or labor force participation.  With extended periods of unemployment 
or employment, risk preferences can change substantially.  Recent work of Malmendier and 
Nagel (2011) also suggests that personal economic experiences of macroeconomic shocks 
explain individual risk preferences.  They show that experiences of high stock market returns 
makes individuals less risk averse and so risk preferences are indeed endogenous to personal 
economic experiences, which is consistent with our conclusion.  
 The main story from section II remains.  Variation in measured risk preferences are 
dominated by changes in individual risk preferences that are uncorrelated with demographics 
or changing economic circumstances.  These apparent random measurement errors in risk 
preferences suggest that one should use considerable caution in using measured risk 
preferences to test theoretical propositions regarding how risk attitudes influence economic 
choices. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
  
Risk aversion plays an important role in economic decisions.  Economists often use 
measured risk aversion as a fixed taste that explains why individuals with the same 
opportunities make different choices under uncertainty.  This paper examines whether the 
                                             
4 Expanding the sample to include individuals with on partial information on demographic or economic 
variables does not change our conclusions. See Appendix 3.   
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measured risk aversion is indeed fixed or if it varies over time.  Utilizing panel data from the 
NLSY79 over a 13-year span, we find that measured risk aversion varies to a much greater 
extent than assumed in past empirical studies where risk aversion is treated as an exogenous 
factor in individual decisions.  Individual risk aversion changes systematically in response 
to changing personal economic circumstances.  While previous cross-sectional studies have 
found evidence that risk aversion is correlated with economic variables, we show that 
measured risk aversion responds to an individual’s recent employment and earnings success.  
Risk aversion increases with lengthening spells of employment and time out of labor force, 
presumably planned time allocations.   Risk aversion decreases with lengthening 
unemployment spells, time allocations that are at least partially outside the individual’s 
control.  Risk aversion rises with income until very high levels and rises with age until age 
43.  The finding that measured risk aversion is endogenous means that one cannot use 
contemporaneously measured risk aversion as an explanatory variable shaping decisions 
under uncertainty. 
More surprisingly, individual measured risk aversion changes dramatically over time 
for unobserved reasons as well.  Fifty-eight percent of the least risk averse individuals at the 
start of our period are in the most risk averse category 13 years later while 12 percent of the 
most risk averse are in the least risk averse group by the end of the sample period.  As a 
result, over half of the variance in risk aversion in the population is due to changing 
individual measured tastes and not to differences in risk aversion across individuals.  This 
seemingly random variation in measured risk aversion suggests that these measures are 
subject to large noise to signal ratios, compromising any interpretation of their measured 
impacts on economic behavior.  
14 
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Table 1—Distribution of categorical responses to income gamble questions over time 
Panel A: Unbalanced panel 
Risk aversion index 1993  2002  2004  2006  
1: the least risk averse 23.9% 18.0% 16.6% 17.2% 
2 17.1% 16.3% 13.9% 14.9% 
3 12.9% 10.7% 16.1% 11.2% 
4: the most risk averse 46.1% 55.0% 53.4% 56.7% 
Total Observation 5,300 
(100%) 
5,583 
(100%) 
5,540 
(100%) 
5,949 
(100%) 
Panel B: Balanced panel subset 
Risk aversion index 
1993 
Risk aversion index 2006 
1 2 3 4 Total 
1: the least risk averse  6.2% 
(26.0%) 
4.0% 
(17.0%) 
2.8% 
(12.0%) 
10.9% 
(46.0%) 
23.8% 
(100%) 
2 2.9% 
(16.8%) 
3.5% 
(20.6%) 
2.0% 
(11.8%) 
8.7% 
(50.8%) 
17.1% 
(100%) 
3 1.8% 
(13.8) 
1.9% 
(14.6%) 
2.5% 
(18.9%) 
7.0% 
(52.7%) 
13.3% 
(100%) 
4: the most risk averse 5.3% 
(11.5%) 
5.3% 
(11.5%) 
4.7% 
(10.3%) 
30.6% 
(66.7%) 
45.8% 
(100%) 
Total  16.1% 14.7% 12.0% 57.1% 100.0% 
Note: Top number is the percentage of all observations. Number in parentheses is the related row 
proportion.  
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Table 2—Variance Decomposition of measured risk aversion ( ) 
 Within variance (SSE) Between variance (SST) Total 
variance 
(TSS) 
Panel A    
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Table 3—Effects of economic factors on change in risk aversion over time 
 Linear Regression Ordered Probit
 Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Betaa Random 
effects 
Clustering 
Time-varying economic factors       
Family income/100,000   0.172*** 
(3.34) 
0.135** 
(2.46) 
0.069 0.117** 
(2.46) 
0.088** 
(2.06) 
(Family income/100,000)2   -0.029** 
(2.52) 
-0.022* 
(1.86) 
-0.043 -0.031*** 
(2.91) 
-0.029*** 
(3.04) 
Recent weeks employed    0.001*** 
(3.99) 
0.001*** 
(3.83) 
0.045 0.002*** 
(6.23) 
0.002*** 
(6.43) 
Recent weeks 
unemployed  
  -0.001** 
(2.12) 
-0.001** 
(2.03) 
-0.015 -0.002*** 
(3.46) 
-0.002*** 
(3.71) 
Recent weeks out of labor 
force 
  0.002*** 
(3.87) 
0.002*** 
(3.33) 
0.037 0.002*** 
(5.14) 
0.002*** 
(5.49) 
Labor market experience 
(in years) 
  0.016*** 
(6.00) 
0.012** 
(1.98) 
0.069 0.014*** 
(5.68) 
0.012*** 
(5.42) 
State unemployment rate   0.003 
(0.54) 
0.0002 
(0.38) 
0.004 0.0003 
(0.56) 
0.0003 
(0.65) 
Non-economic controls        
Age 0.074*** 
(3.61) 
0.072*** 
(3.40) 
 0.042* 
(1.96) 
0.192 0.035 
(1.53) 
0.029 
(1.36) 
Age2 -0.001*** 
(2.60) 
-0.001** 
(2.39) 
 -0.0005* 
(1.74) 
-0.171 -0.0004 
(1.33)  
-0.0003 
(1.16) 
Education (in years)  -0.027 
(1.31) 
 -0.026 
(1.27) 
-0.054 -0.010* 
(1.94) 
-0.007* 
(1.66) 
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Number of children  0.004 
(0.30) 
 -0.0001 
(0.01) 
0.0001 0.011 
(1.24) 
0.010 
(1.26) 
Married  0.084** 
(2.74) 
 0.056* 
(1.73) 
0.023 0.100*** 
(3.88) 
0.099*** 
(4.23) 
Male      -0.216*** 
(8.88) 
-0.187*** 
(9.12) 
White      0.027 
(1.05) 
0.022 
(0.98) 
Constant 0.184 
(0.48) 
0.522 
(1.14) 
1.517*** 
(24.27) 
2.043*** 
(4.36) 
   
R2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46    
1-R2 (within variance %) 54% 54% 54% 54%    
Total observation (n) 21,706 21,706 21,706 21,706  21,706 21,706 
Cut1      0.016 
[0.438] 
0.028 
[0.395] 
Cut2      0.603 
[0.438] 
0.522 
[0.395] 
Cut3      1.003 
[0.438] 
0.858 
[0.395] 
Note: a Fully standardized coefficients. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are in brackets. */**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1.
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Appendix 1 
 
With n individuals in the sample and 4 temporally separated measures of risk 
aversion for each individual i, the total sum of square (TSS) is given by 
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Appendix 2—Descriptive statistics 
  Mean (Std) 
Variables Definition 1993 2002 2004 2006 
Risk aversion index Ordered categorical variable 
(1-4) 
1 = the least risk averse 
4 = the most risk averse 
2.81 
(1.24) 
3.03 
(1.19) 
3.07 
(1.15) 
3.09 
(1.18) 
Net Family income  39,251 
(31,314) 
63,011 
(58,545) 
68,002 
(65,670) 
74,707 
(75,604) 
Recent length of 
employment   
Weeks employed in past 2 
years if currently employed 
34.17 
(21.55) 
75.14 
(39.42) 
74.09 
(39.66) 
75.97 
(38.52) 
Recent length of 
unemployment   
Weeks unemployed in past 2 
years if currently 
unemployed 
1.61 
(10.35) 
1.84 
(12.69) 
5.71 
(23.10) 
6.01 
(23.44) 
Recent length of out of 
labor force 
Weeks out of labor force in 
past 2 years if currently out 
of labor force 
6.54 
(17.53) 
10.20 
(28.74) 
14.60 
(34.35) 
12.07 
(31.56) 
Work experience Previously labor market 
experience (in years) 
10.35 
(3.92) 
17.56 
(5.67) 
19.08 
(6.10) 
20.65 
(6.37) 
Unemployment rate Local unemployment rate 7.49 
(2.57) 
6.68 
(2.41) 
5.71 
(1.51) 
5.02 
(1.49) 
Age Age (in years) 31.58 
(2.25) 
40.55 
(2.25) 
42.55 
(2.25) 
44.55 
(2.26) 
Education (in year) Years in schooling 13.16 
(2.42) 
13.36 
(2.48) 
13.39 
(2.49) 
13.42 
(2.50) 
Number of kids Number of kids in household 1.37 
(1.28) 
1.44 
(1.29) 
1.34 
(1.25) 
1.25 
(1.22) 
Married = 1 if married 0.59 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
Male = 1 if male 0.46 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
White = 1 if female 0.68 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.64 
(0.47) 
Total observation (n)  5,197 5,424 5,387 5,698 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Appendix 3—Effects of economic factors on change in risk aversion over time with different total observations 
 Linear Regression Ordered Probit
 Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Betaa Random 
effects 
Clustering 
Time-varying economic factors       
Family income/100,000   0.173*** 
(3.35) 
0.136** 
(2.48) 
0.072 0.113** 
(2.43) 
0.093** 
(2.20) 
(Family income/100,000)2   -0.029** 
(2.53) 
-0.022* 
(1.87) 
-0.044 -0.030*** 
(2.84) 
-0.030*** 
(3.15) 
Recent weeks employed    0.001*** 
(3.99) 
0.001*** 
(3.84) 
0.052 0.002*** 
(5.98) 
0.002*** 
(6.33) 
Recent weeks 
unemployed  
  -0.001*** 
(2.12) 
-0.001** 
(2.03) 
-0.008 -0.002 
(3.28) 
-0.002*** 
(3.54) 
Recent weeks out of labor 
force 
  0.002*** 
(3.87) 
0.002*** 
(3.33)) 
0.045 0.002 
(5.20) 
0.002*** 
(5.57) 
Labor market experience  
(in years) 
  0.016*** 
(6.00) 
0.012** 
(1.98) 
0.081 0.015*** 
(6.15) 
0.012*** 
(5.63) 
State unemployment rate   0.0003 
(0.53) 
0.0002 
(0.37) 
0.003 0.0002 
(0.55) 
0.0003 
(0.61) 
Non-economic controls        
Age 0.067*** 
(3.65) 
0.064*** 
(3.37) 
 0.042* 
(1.93) 
0.157 0.037 
(1.61) 
0.030 
(1.45) 
Age2 -0.001*** 
(2.51) 
-0.001** 
(2.24) 
 -0.0004* 
(1.73) 
-0.149 -0.0004 
(1.43) 
-0.0003 
(1.25) 
Education (in years)  -0.024 
(1.35) 
 -0.026 
(1.27) 
-0.039 -0.012** 
(2.42) 
-0.008* 
(1.90) 
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Number of children  0.007 
(0.64) 
 0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.001 0.013 
(1.46) 
0.011 
(1.40) 
Married  0.066** 
(2.40) 
 0.056* 
(1.73) 
.020 0.103*** 
(4.06) 
0.095*** 
(4.10) 
Male      -0.207*** 
(8.71) 
-0.184 
(9.07) 
White      0.029 
(1.13) 
0.022 
(1.02) 
Constant 1.300*** 
(3.79) 
1.631*** 
(4.02) 
2.516*** 
(40.33) 
2.046*** 
(4.37) 
   
R2 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47    
1-R2 (within variance %) 53% 53% 53% 53%    
Observations (n) 25,784 25,783 22,042 22,042 22,042 22,042 22,042 
Cut1      -0.007 
[0.428] 
0.048 
[0.390] 
Cut2      0.577 
[0.428] 
0.540 
[0.390] 
Cut3      0.972 
[0.428] 
0.874 
[0.390] 
 
